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In early December, the U.S. President brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. The commitment involved an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Not long after, however, a sharply contrasting approach to conflict emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, hitting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President declared, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Strategic Pivot

These divergent actions encapsulates the central tenet of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a stepping back from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on economic deals and stopping hostilities—though how this squares with the emerging air campaign in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a senior U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration spokesperson echoed this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Contradictions

This pivot is major, but analysts caution it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is complicated by the President’s direct manner, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained an analyst for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis estimates this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Apathy and Tensions

Unlike his immediate predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable engagement with African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant dispute has broken out with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Conditional Intervention

A comparable tension emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the stern rhetoric may have prompted the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

An Echo of Rivals

Some analysts describe the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the current policy likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.